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Abstract
This paper measures the importance of bank-firm relationships in obtaining higher credit “limits.”  We use
data from a relatively unused section of the National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF, 1993) on
credit limits, credit sources, and contract terms for firms with lines of credit from multiple banks.  This lets
us isolate the credit limit that each bank provides the same firm, eliminating the need to control for often
immeasurable, unreliable, or firm-specific “soft” information.  For a median Line of Credit (LOC) of
$250,000, we find that a bank with a five-year information advantage provides a LOC limit that is $20,000
higher.  We also find that purchase of loan and non-loan services by firm from the contracting bank affects
the credit limit differently.  Non-loan services increase the credit limit and loan services decrease the credit
limit. Our findings confirm anecdotal claims from the small business community that relationships are vital
to secure higher credit limits.  We check for the robustness of our results to outliers, sample selection, and
stratification across firm organization types.
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2The Importance of Being Known:
Relationship Banking and Credit Limits
Abstract
This paper measures the importance of bank-firm relationships in obtaining higher credit
“limits.”  We use data from a relatively unused section of the National Survey of Small
Business Finance (NSSBF, 1993) on credit limits, credit sources, and contract terms for
firms with lines of credit from multiple banks.  This lets us isolate the credit limit that
each bank provides the same firm, eliminating the need to control for often
immeasurable, unreliable, or firm-specific “soft” information.  For a median Line of
Credit (LOC) of $250,000, we find that a bank with a five-year information advantage
provides a LOC limit that is $20,000 higher.  We also find that purchase of loan and non-
loan services by firm from the contracting bank affects the credit limit differently.  Non-
loan services increase the credit limit and loan services decrease the credit limit. Our
findings confirm anecdotal claims from the small business community that relationships
are vital to secure higher credit limits.  We check for the robustness of our results to
outliers, sample selection, and stratification across firm organization types.
1.  Introduction
How does a bank’s ability to produce private information about a borrower affect its
credit rationing practices?  Do firms obtain higher credit limits from the banks with
which they have transacted for longer durations vis-à-vis from banks with which they
have transacted for shorter durations?  If so, how much?
Economic theory predicts that a bank’s ability to produce reliable private information
lowers the information asymmetry between the firm and the bank, and facilitates higher
credit limits (Leland and Pyle, 1977, Diamond, 1984).1  The social embeddedness
approach in sociological theory predicts that bank/firm interactions over time would lead
to private networks of social relations between entrepreneurs and bank officials; again,
                                                
1 See Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) and Freixas and Rochet (1997) for recent surveys.
3leading to higher credit limits (Uzzi, 1999).2   While access to such private information
and networks is particularly important in lending to legally opaque, personality-driven
small businesses, direct empirical evidence of the effect of bank/borrower relationships
on credit limits is sparse.
Previous work on relationship banking has examined the effect of relationship durations
on the interest rate charged (Petersen and Rajan, 1994), on the probability of the loan
being secured by collateral (Berger and Udell, 1995), and on the probability of the loan
application being rejected (Cole, 1998).  Yet there is little empirical evidence to suggest
that relationships may affect the credit limit banks are willing to commit and supply to a
firms' future financing needs.
Credit limits on lines of credits (LOCs) are an important source of financing for small
business (Jayaratne and Wolken, 1999 and Mitusch, 1999).  Since these funds are not
asset or project specific, they also represent substantial credit risk for a lender.  A lender
can reduce some of these risks by producing reliable private information through repeated
interaction over time.  This paper examines the extent to which credit limits are affected
by bank-borrowing relationships using data from the National Survey of Small Business
Finance (NSSBF, 1993).
The credit limits that banks are willing to commit to firms are a function of owner, firm,
contract, and bank characteristics plus the strength of the embedded relationship between
the bank and the firm.  For small businesses, owner characteristics may be the most
important determinant of the banks' credit decisions.  Unfortunately, most of these
attributes are ''soft'' information, i.e., information that cannot be unambiguously
documented by any dataset (Stein, 2000).  For instance, the owner might be a skilled
entrepreneur with specialized knowledge and experience in a field of enterprise.  For the
bank, the owner’s expertise may become the most important determinant in making a
credit decision—an example of what Stein calls a “character loan.”  Yet, in the absence
                                                
2 This is a consequence of social networks leading to exchange protocols and a system of long-term
reciprocity beyond the immediate credit transaction.
4of such ''soft'' information in the data, the researcher is forced to relegate this factor to the
error term, causing omitted variable bias.
The NSSBF data allows us to design an estimating procedure that circumvents this
problem.  By looking at the difference in the LOC limits that two banks have provided
the same firm, our econometric specification eliminates the need to control for owner and
firm characteristics. These characteristics are treated as Fixed Effects that both
contracting banks observe, but the dataset cannot measure.  Our differencing procedure
also allows us to incorporate other relationship-related variables that may be important to
credit limits.  Number of financial services that firms obtain from banks is included as a
proxy for differences in the intensity of bank/firm activity.  Additionally, we allow for
differences in the lending institution and contract features to affect the difference in credit
limits.
Our procedure of looking at how the differences in relationships affect the differences in
credit limits allows us to overcome some of the “traditional” econometric problems
encountered in this area. For example, (1) it avoids multicolinearity problems caused by
the strong correlation between firm characteristics and key relationship measures,3 (2) It
avoids the problems of omitted variable bias in a level specification, and (3) it avoids
measurement and reporting errors of firm characteristics given by company accounts—
which may be easily altered by the owner.4
Our results add to the previous findings on relationship banking.  For a median credit
limit of $250,000 a bank with a five-year information advantage provides a credit limit
that is $20,000 higher.  Berger and Udell (1995) find that a one-year information
advantage is associated with a 33-basis point reduction on the LOC interest rate and a
reduction in the probability of the lender requiring collateral.  Cole (1998) finds that
                                                
3 For instance, the correlation coefficient between firm age (a proxy for public information about the firm)
and the duration of relationship between the firms and their most recent lender (the principal proxy for the
strength of relationship) is 0.49 (NSSBF, 1993). Berger and Udell (1995) report a correlation coefficient of
0.476 for the 1987 dataset. Cole (1998) argues the importance of disentangling these effects.
4 Bushong (1995) questions the usefulness of small business financial statements for loan officers and their
credit decisions.
5having at least a year of relationship increases the probability of a loan application
approval.  The evidence confirms what is intuitively and anecdotally clear: Relationships
matter even for credit limits.
We also find that a borrower’s access to and purchase of other loan and non-loan
financial services impacts credit limits differently.  We find that the number of loan
services obtained is negatively associated with the LOC limit, while the number of non-
loan services is positively associated.  The former, while generating additional
information about the firms, also increases the banks' risk exposure.  The latter generates
information without increasing the banks’ risk exposure.  By providing a menu of
services, banks generate information that is fungible across these services.  For example,
banks’ decisions about LOC commitments may be influenced by information gathered
while providing brokerage services to firms.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional details of a LOC
loan and surveys the literature.  Section 3 describes the econometric framework.  Section
4 presents the data and the derivation of variables used.  Section 5 presents the results, the
stratification of the sample, and robustness checks to outliers.  Section 6 discusses policy
implications and research direction.
2.  Background
In an LOC contract, a bank promises to lend funds up to a limit, within a certain time
period (usually a year), at preset price and non-price conditions.5  The price conditions in
a typical LOC contract include a borrower-specific markup over an economy-wide
interest rate, and an up-front commitment fee.  The non-price conditions include
collateral requirements, compensating balances, and a Material Adverse Change (MAC)
clause that gives the bank the option to escape its lending obligations if the borrower's
condition deteriorates, in terms of balance sheet, litigation, etc. Commitments are usually
                                                
5 This Section draws heavily from Melnik and Plaut (1986), Avery and Berger (1991), Shockley and
Thakor (1999), and anecdotal evidence from Edward Bayone, Chief Credit Officer, BankBoston.
6for one year, with provisions made for extensions and renegotiation. 6  After the
expiration of each commitment period the terms of the agreement are renegotiated,
incorporating the information gathered by both parties in the preceding period.
Avery and Berger (1991) condense the major motives behind the use of LOCs by firms.
The liquidity-flexibility hypothesis holds that LOCs allow the loan paperwork and
evaluation to be performed in advance, so that funds can be obtained quickly and cheaply
at the appropriate time when expenditures are required.  Moreover, in a ‘credit crunch’
LOCs provide protection against being rationed out.  A second hypothesis suggests that
LOCs provide firms with insurance against a potential decline in their credit worthiness
by locking in loan parameters consistent with their current risk class.  Thus, LOCs may
be seen as put options on debt claims or call options on interest rate markups.
The importance of LOCs for business operations is highlighted in Figure A1 of the
appendix showing the ratio of aggregate credit limits to total assets for firms in our
sample.  Forty percent of the firms have credit limits that constitute more than half the
value of their total assets and twenty percent of the firms had credit limits that exceeded
the value of their total assets.  The credit limits have a median of $250,000 and a mean of
$1.5 million.
Lines of Credit are an attractive vehicle for studying the bank-borrower relationship
because they are not ''transaction-driven'' (Berger and Udell, 1995).  Given the fungible
nature of funds, it is difficult to track their final use.   For this reason they are perceived
to be riskier for the lender.7  In ''transaction-driven'' loans, magnitude and other
parameters reflect the specific transaction the loan is financing.  An LOC, on the other
hand, is used mainly for working capital needs.  In this sense, LOC contracts to firms are
akin to credit cards to consumers, where a credit limit and other price and non-price
conditions are specified without being tied to a specific transaction.  Like a credit card
                                                
6 74 percent of all LOCs in the Most Recent Loan (MRL) Section of the NSSBF data are contracts of one
year or less.
7 Credit officers say that they derive information about the firm's use of active LOCs by the pattern of usage
(Edward Bayone, BankBoston).
7limit, the LOC limit is the quantity of credit the bank is willing to supply to the firm.  The
firm's demand for credit may be more or less than this quantity.
Figure A2 of the Appendix shows the average usage rate of credit limits in our sample.
Half the firms had usage rates below 50% of the total available limit and 17% had
exhausted their total available limit.
Recent empirical work by Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger and Udell (1995), and Cole
(1998) bases the empirical findings of firms’ Most Recent Loan (MRL) data in measuring
the importance of relationship on small business credit.   Since the quantity reported for
the MRL is determined both by demand and supply phenomena, no analysis of quantity is
possible using the MRL data.8  Instead, we utilize a relatively unused segment of the
NSSBF data on Line of Credit limits that the banks have committed to supply.
This limit is a function of a firm’s risk category as perceived by the lender, according to
theories on credit rationing by Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
Repeated interactions with firms, over time, allow banks to place firms in a lower risk
class by mitigating information asymmetries between them (Boot and Thakor, 2000).
Hence, the length of relationship and the breadth of financial services firms obtain from
banks must have explanatory power on credit limits.
3.  Methodology
Consider firm i that has two LOCs from two banks: j and k.  Following Melnik and Plaut
(1986), we write two equations, [1a] and [1b].  Here, ijLIMIT and ikLIMIT are the credit
limits that the firm has secured from the two banks.  Both limits depend on the firm, and
owner characteristics iF .  We assume these characteristics to be fixed effects that both
                                                
8 A subset of MRLs are LOCs, but the quantity reported is the amount utilized by the firm.
8banks observe uniformly.9  In addition, these limits depend on the corresponding loan
contract features ijC  and ikC , on the bank characteristics jB  and kB , and on the strength
of the relationships ijR  and ikR ,
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In writing equations [1a] and [1b], we treat the credit limit as the quantity of funds the
banks are willing to supply—conditioned on contract features, borrower characteristics,
lender characteristics, and strength of relationship.  Again, it is best to think of the credit
card analogy, where the credit limit is different from the credit the consumer had
utilized—the latter indicative of the consumer’s demand.  Similarly, the demand for
credit by the firm may be more, less, or equal to the credit limit.  This is seen by
examining the firms’ usage rates of their credit limits: in our sample, 50% of the firms
used less than 50% of their limit, 25% used their entire limit.  If we think of usage as
indicative of the firms’ demands for credit, the under-utilizers are firms whose demands
were less than the limit, while firms at the limit had demands greater than or equal to the
limit.  For empirical estimation, we proceed to subtract [1b] from [1a] to obtain [1c].
]1[)()()()()( 432 cBBRRCCLIMITLIMIT ikijkjikijikijikij eebbb -+-+-+-=-
This explains the difference in credit limit that the firm had obtained from two banks as a
function of the difference in contract features, the difference in relationship strength, and
the difference in bank characteristics.  Note that this eliminates the need to control for
often unreliable or immeasurable firm and owner characteristics iF .
10
                                                
9 It is possible that the firm may have changed between the negotiations of the first and the second credit
limits.  Since credit lines are mostly short term and typically renegotiated annually; significant changes in
firm or owner characteristics are unlikely.
10 In the statistics literature this is called a static group experiment.  For a theoretical discussion see Meyer
(1994).
9Other than eliminating the need to control for iF , this approach has additional
advantages.  The empirical literature on relationship banking has used the length of
relationship as a measure for the strength of relationship (private information), while
using the firm age as a measure of public information (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, Berger
and Udell, 1995, and Cole, 1998).  Both factors are important for the banks’ credit
decisions.  In the data, the length of relationship with the contracting bank for the Most
Recent Loan (MRL) and the firm age are highly correlated, resulting in strong
multicolinearity (Cole, 1998).  Disentangling the private from the public information
effects caused problems.  In the present formulation, firm age is a fixed effect that is
eliminated in the subtraction.  The result is a direct estimate of the benefit of private
relationship.
4. Data and Description of Variables
Sections F7-F153 of the National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF, 1993)
provides information on LOC limits.  The information includes the credit limit, collateral
requirements, usage, and information about contracting banks.11  NSSBF also provides
data on the length of the relationships that firms have had with banks, as well as
information regarding the financial services firms obtained from the banks.  We isolate
the 226 firms that have two LOCs from two banks.12
Figure A3 of Appendix illustrates the relative credit limits.  The histogram gives the
frequency for the ratio of the higher limit to the lower limit: 16% of the firms have
                                                
11 The NSSBF has no information on the timeline of credit line approvals.  How does one credit line affect
the other?  It is routine for banks to inquire applying firms about its existing credit lines with other banks.
TSeeing an already approved credit limit and its corresponding credit history may be a positive signal for
them.    On the other hand, already approved credit limits entail the possibility of the firm being highly
leveraged and therefore in a higher risk category.   Also note that it is the usage and not the limit of the
credit line that appears as a balance sheet item.
12 What firms have multiple lines of credit?  Table I of Data Appendix presents results of two models: A
binary Probit model that explains the presence or absence of multiple LOCs, and a Poisson model for count
data for 0, 1, 2, or 3 LOCs.  For a discussion on why firms might obtain credit from multiple sources see
Chakraborty and Hu (working paper).  It suffices to say here that larger firms, older firms, and corporations
with a higher current ratio, serving multiple markets tend to have multiple LOCs.  We will adjust for
sample selection in checking for the robustness of our results.
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identical credit limits from the two sources.  The higher limit was more than 200% the
lower limit for half the firms.
From the credit limit data we construct our dependent variable LIMITD , which is the log
difference between the two credit limits.13
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The log-differenced formulation compresses outliers and makes interpretation
convenient.  Approximately 15% of the firms obtained the same credit limit from both
banks, and 35% got from one bank a limit that is more than double the limit they got
from the other.
Our main proxy to measure the strength of relationship is the number of years the firm
has transacted with the banks.  The longer the borrower has been transacting with the
lender, the more viable the business, and more trustworthy its owner (Diamond, 1984).
Loans to longtime customers will be seen as less risky, and banks might increase their
willingness to provide funds (Petersen and Rajan, 1994).  Moreover, social embededness
increases with the duration of the relationship.  Time permits personal opportunities for
reciprocity to emerge between owners and loan officers outside the immediate realm of
the loan transaction (Ongena and Smith, 2001 and Degryse and Ongena, 2001).  The
variable used in our estimation LENGTHD is the difference in the length of relationship
the firm has had with the two banks.14  We expect a positive coefficient on LENGTHD .
As Table I in illustrates, the average difference in length of relationship in the sample is 5
years, with a maximum of 20, and a skew to the right.15
                                                
13 There are 8 firms with complete data for a third LOC.  But including those firms in our differencing
methodology would overweigh those firms in the sample and may cause possible estimation bias.
14 The order of the subtraction in limit is preserved through all the differenced variables.  We are precluded
from taking the log of these differences due to the possibility of the differences being negative, and in terms
of ratios the prevalence of zeros.
15 This necessitates a check for sensitivity to outliers.
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In addition to interactions over time, relationships can be built through interactions over
multiple financial products, sometimes called the multiplexity of relationship (Uzzi,
1999).  Deposit accounts, brokerage services, cash management services, etc. help reveal
information about the firm and can mitigate information asymmetries between the
borrower and the lender.  We capture this dimension by counting the number of financial
services firms obtain from banks.  In looking at financial services, a distinction needs to
be made between loan and non-loan services.  The former, while providing information
about the firm, also increases the bank’s risk exposure vis-à-vis the firm.  The latter
provides information without increasing risks.  Both provide the lender the opportunity to
spread any fixed costs of information production and storage (Petersen and Rajan, 1994).
We construct 3 variables: the difference in the total number of financial services
SERVD , the difference in the number of non-loan services NLSERVD , and the
difference in the number of loan services LSERVD .16  On average, there is a difference
of 1.4 in the number of financial services firms obtain from banks, and this ratio is
skewed to the right.  We expect a positive coefficient on NLSERVD .  The coefficient
signs of the other two service variables are ambiguous, due to the competing effects of
risk and information.
For contract features, we obtain a count of various collateral types required to secure the
line of credit.  Collateral minimizes losses in case of default, enabling banks to commit
more credit (Rajan and Winton, 1995, Bester, 1985 and Klapper 2001).  We expect a
positive coefficient on collateral requirements.  The various types of collateral include
inventory, equipment, real estate, security deposits, and compensating balances.  The
variable COLLATD is the difference in the count of collateral types required to secure the
LOCs.  This is an improvement from previous work that uses a binary variable to indicate
collateral or no-collateral requirements in the contract (Berger and Udell, 1995).
To examine whether differences in the lending institution changes the provision of credit,
we divide the lending institution into Commercial Banks and Other Institutions. If bank j
                                                
16 Non-loan services are checking accounts, savings accounts, brokerage services, cash management
services, transaction services, credit-related advisory services, and 401K plans.  Loan services are leasing
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is a commercial bank, then 1=jBANK and zero otherwise.  We construct the trinomial
dummy variable,17
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Commercial banks, which are usually larger, may enjoy economies of scale in
information production and transaction costs (Boyd and Prescott, 1986, James and Weir,
1990 and Berger, Klapper and Udell, 2001).  This implies that commercial banks can
better manage credit risk and provide more credit.  We expect a positive coefficient on
BANKD .
We also include a variable to capture the relative distance between the firm and the
banks.  We conjecture that the bank closer to the firm’s area of operation is likely to have
more information about the firm that it will use to facilitate credit.  However, recent
evidence from Petersen and Rajan (2000) show that advances in communication and
information technology have facilitated long distance lending relationships between
banks and small business.  As a result, distance is less of an impediment to facilitate
credit.  We construct the following variable and leave the sign of its coefficient as an
empirical question.
   kj DISTDISTDIST -=D
5.  Results
                                                                                                                                                
facilities, mortgages, equipment, and vehicle loans.
17 See Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991), Econometric Models, pages 121-123 for a theoretical discussion on
trinomial dummies.
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Column (1) of Table II reports the OLS estimates for explaining the difference in credit
limit using our main measure of relationship LENGTHD  together with COLLATD  and
BANKD .  The variable LENGTHD  is significant in explaining the difference in credit
limits.  If a firm has an additional year of relationship with bank i relative to bank j then it
will secure from bank i a Loan Commitment that is 1.6% higher.  For a median LOC
limit of $250,000 a bank with a 5-year relationship advantage provides $20,000 more in
credit facilities.  The significant coefficient on the collateral variable indicates that a bank
will provide a credit limit that is 26% higher if the loan is secured by one additional type
of collateral.  There is no evidence to indicate that the bank type or distance matters for
LOC limits.
Column (2) of Table II incorporates a second measure of relationship: SERVD ; the
difference in the total number of financial services the firm obtains from the banks.  This
variable does not distinguish between loan and non-loan services.  The insignificant
coefficient indicates that, at least in its present form, the total number of services does not
add any explanatory power to the regression.  The other variables remain unaffected in
magnitude and significance.
Column (3) of Table II decomposes services into loan and non-loan services, while
dropping the aggregate services term.  The significance of non-loan services in
explaining the LOC limit confirms our expectations.  If the firm obtains one additional
non-loan service from a bank, it can secure a credit limit that is 17% higher.  This
justifies the decomposition of financial services.  The coefficient on loan services is
insignificant, indicating the competing risk and information effects of loan services.
Column (4) of Table II drops the commercial bank dummy.  This makes the loan services
variable significant and negative.  Since commercial banks tend to provide a larger array
of loan services, the commercial bank dummy and the loan-services variables are
correlated.  By having an additional loan service, the firms obtain a credit limit that is on
average 0.6% lower.
14
5.1  Stratification
The first few years of relationship are likely to be more important in mitigating
information asymmetries between firm and lender.  The familiarity, thereon, must lead to
an information-saturation, as in other relationships.  Cole (1998) finds that completing a
year of relationship is significant in explaining the probability of a loan application being
accepted.  Moreover, the information that the lender generated in the first few years of a
10-year relationship may have changed, and needs to be updated.  Hence, the value of
information from a 5-year relationship may not be different from the value of information
generated from a 10-year relationship.  In such a scenario, the purchase of services,
which are current transactions, must be more important for the banks’ credit decisions.
To test this, we divide our sample into firms that have had a 5-year relationship (called a
‘mature’ relationship) with both banks and the others that have either one or no ‘mature’
relationships.  Column (1) of Table III reports the results for the sub-sample of firms with
two mature relationships, and Column (2) of Table III reports the results for the other
firms.  As expected, when both relationships are mature, the length of relationship adds
no marginal value to the LOC limit.  The length of relationship is important for those
with one or no ‘mature’ relationships.  The service variables are important for firms with
two mature relationships and insignificant for the others.  There is also a statistically
significant increase in the strength of the collateral variable for firms with one or no
mature relationships.  For banks, the collateral that a new customer can provide is more
important than the services it purchases, in case the firm is a “fly-by-night.”18
The relationship dimensions important for corporations are likely to be different than
those for sole-proprietorships and partnerships.  In particular, corporate management may
change in the course of a relationship, and more current relations through financial
services may be more important.  Moreover, limited liability in corporations puts
restrictions on assets that can be liquidated in case of default.  To test these possible
                                                
18 The stratification was also done using 3 and 4 years of relationship as cut-off for ‘mature’ relationship.
The shift in the significance of the length variable occurs at 5 years.
15
differences in corporations, Column (3) of Table III isolates the sub-sample of
corporations.  Due to degrees of freedom restrictions we can only compare the results of
Column (3) to the full sample in Column (4) of Table II.  For corporations relative to the
full sample, the effect of relationship length weakens statistically, the effect of non-loan
services strengthens, and the effect of collateral strengthens.
5.2 Sample Selection
Column (4) of Table III checks the robustness of the result to sample selection.  We
follow Heckman’s (1979) two-step estimation procedure.  In the first stage, using all
firms, we estimate a Probit equation explaining the probability, pˆ , of a firm having two
lines of credit using firm characteristics F .19  For each firm in the selected sample, i.e.,
the firms with two lines of credit, we compute the nonlinear adjustment term
)ˆ(/)ˆ( pp Ff ; where )( ×f  and )( ×F  are the probability density and cumulative density
functions of a standard normal distribution. 20  In the second stage, this term is used as a
regressor in the least squares regression to adjust for sample selection.
The results are reported in Column (4) of Table III.  The adjustment for sample selection
does not alter our main result.  The coefficients remain significant and stable.  The only
difference is that the intercept term is now statistically zero.21
                                                
19 The results of the Probit selection equation is given in Column (2) of Table A1.
20 This is the inverse Mills’ ratio for a censored normal.
21 This improves our regression in one noticeable way: if there is no relationship or contractual difference
in the two credit sources, i.e., all regressors are equal to zero, our model suggests that there should be no
difference in the credit limits that the two sources provide, or 1=÷÷
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.  Since our dependendent variable is log form, the constant term is predicted to
be zero, which is established in the regression reported in Column (4) of Table III.
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5.3 Interest Rates
Column (5) of Table III includes a proxy for the relative interest rates.  The NSSBF
provides data on the unused proportion (typical balance) in LOC accounts.    The proxy
we suggest rests on the following argument:  If a firm has two active lines of credit, it
will first pay-off the LOC channel that charges the higher interest rate, i.e., given its
availability of funds, it will keep a higher unused balance in the L/C that charges a higher
interest rate.  This is akin to a consumer with multiple credit cards paying off the card
that charges a higher rate of interest first.  Hence, we use the difference in balance
BALANCED  as a proxy for relative interest rates.22
A higher value of BALANCED  proxies a higher relative interest rate on the LOC contract
provided by bank j relative to bank k.  As the Loan Commitment theory of Melnik and
Plaut (1986) suggests, by charging a higher interest rate a bank can afford to offer a
higher loan commitment; since the increase in risk due to lending more to an individual
borrower has been compensated by the higher rate.  Column (4) illustrates that the
interest rate proxy returns the correct sign while keeping the other coefficients
significant.
5.4 Sensitivity to outliers
Recall from Section 4 that the variables used were skewed and need to be checked for
sensitivity to outliers.  Columns (1) to (3) of Table IV use the DFBETA method to check
the robustness of the estimates to outliers (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch, 1980).  The method
focuses on one coefficient at a time, and measures the change in the coefficient as one
data point is dropped (jack-knifed) at each running of the regression.  We drop the five
most influential data points and check for the robustness of the result.  Column (1) of
                                                
22 In calculating this we exclude 26 firms that have used up their entire limit on both LOCs.  Clearly, these
data points convey no information on the relative interest rate.
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Table IV focuses on the length-of-relationship coefficient, Columns (2) and (3) focus on
the service coefficients.  Our results are robust to the exclusion of outliers.
6. Conclusion and Discussion
We investigated how bank-borrower relationships affect the credit limits of US small
business.  Our main finding is that the credit limit extended by the lender increases with
the length of the borrower-lender relationship.  In particular, for a median LOC limit of
$250,000, a bank with a 5-year relationship advantage provides $20,000 more in credit
facilities. Insofar as the length of relationship is a proxy for private information generated
within a relationship, our results indicate that, after a certain threshold, added years of
relationship may not be as useful.  For example, for firms with two relationships that both
exceed 5 years (“mature” relationships), an additional year of relationship adds no
statistically significant benefit in terms of credit limit.  Within 5 years of business, firms
reveal their true type and banks incorporate the information fully into their loan
decisions.  It is for firms with either one or no “mature” relationships that an additional
year of business brings statistically detectable credit benefits to firm.
We also find that the number of loan and non-loan services the firm purchases from
banks affects credit limits differently.  The credit limit increases with non-loan services
and decreases with loan services.  Loan services, while providing information about the
firm’s repayment patterns, punctuality, etc., also increase the lender’s risk exposure vis-à-
vis the borrowing firm.  Non-loan services are primarily information generators, and have
a strong positive effect on the credit limit.23
The methodology we used to obtain these results avoids a few important data problems
that the empirical literature on relationship banking has struggled to overcome. We
achieve this by looking at a single firm’s interactions with two banks—eliminating the
need to control for confounding firm and owner characteristics that we treat as fixed
effects.
                                                
23 When it comes to financial services, we are unable to distinguish between relationship effects and
product “bundling” effects.
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Our process subtracts out often immeasurable, unreliable, or “soft” information on
balance sheets, owner characteristics, public information, etc.  Also, among the fixed
effects subtracted out is firm age—a proxy for the set of public information about firm,
and a measure highly correlated with the length of bank-firm relationships.  This allows a
statistically clean derivation of the impact of private information from lender –borrower
relationship.
Bank-borrower relationship captures an economic setting where formal arm’s length ties
seamlessly interact with personal bonds that borrowers form with loan officers and other
bank agents.  Legally opaque, personality driven small businesses benefit immensely
from these interactions, in terms of credit availability, cheaper loans, less-restrictive
terms, and higher limits.  Given fairly specific loan pricing guidelines that banks require
their officers to follow, the credit limit may be a loan variable that the loan officers find
easier to influence.  Furthermore, since credit lines are not directly tied to the size of a
specific project, these credit limits are not strictly bound by the expected needs of the
project.  This gives the credit officer even more leeway in adjusting the credit limit in
accordance with the set of private information acquired through the relationship.  Our
results are consistent with such behavior.
It is an important matter of public policy to realize the value of information that is
generated through what we term a relationship—repeated interactions over a length of
time.   Banks act as repositories for this economically valuable information and use it to
reduce uncertainties associated with lending to small businesses.  As Stein (2000) argues,
bank mergers and closures can lead to structures that limit bank-borrower relationships to
arm’s length ties, as well as a loss of valuable accrued information.  Our results indicate
that regulators overseeing bank consolidations must be wary of this concern.
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Variable Mean Median Max Std
Independent
Difference in the Length of
relationship
5 3 20 8.4
Difference in Number of Total
Services
1.4 1 5 1.8
Difference in Number of Non-Loan
Services
0.4 0 3 0.7
Difference in the Number of Loan
Services
1 1 5 1.6
Difference in the Number of Collateral Types Securing Credit
Line
0.6 0 5 1.2
Difference in Distance to
Bank
85 6 989 193
(?DIST=Distance to bank 1 minus Distance to bank
2)
Dependent
Log Difference in the Credit
Limit
1.1 0.8 4.9 0.9
(?LIMIT=ln(Credit Limit from bank 1 divided by Credit Limit from
bank 2)
(?COLLAT=Number of Collateral types securing credit line from bank 1
minusNumber of Collateral types securing credit line from
bank 2)
(?LENGTH= Length of relationship with bank 1 minus Length of
relationshipwith bank 2), in
years
(?SERV=Number of Financial Services obtained from bank 1 minus
Number ofFinancial Services obtained from bank
2)
(?NLSERV=Number of Non-Loan Services obtained from bank 1
minusNumber of NonLoan Services obtained from bank
2)
Univariate Statistics of
Variables
Table I
(?LSERV=Number of Loan Services obtained from bank 1 minus
Number ofLoan Services obtained from bank
2)
The derivation of the variables are given in parentheses.  The descriptive statistics reported for the independent variables are for the absolute
value of each differenced series.  For an example, the data shows an average 5-year relationship difference between a firm's two contracting
banks.  The dependent variable is in log differenced form.  We decide not to use a log specification for the independent variables due to the
prevalence of zeros which pushes the log values to infinity. Non-loan services are checking accounts, savings accounts, brokerage services, 
management services, transaction services, credit-related advisory services, and 401K plans.  Loan services are leasing facilities, mortgages,
equipment, and vehicle loans.  Collateral include inventory, equipment, real estate, security deposits, and compensating balances in checking or
savings accounts.
24
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Difference in the Years of Relationship 0.016** 0.016** 0.013** 0.015**
(?LENGTH) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Difference in Number of Total Services - 0.002 - -
(?SERV) (0.06)
Difference in Number of Non-Loan Services - - 0.17** 0.17**
(?NLSERV) (0.07) (0.07)
Difference in the Number of Loan Services - - -0.05 -0.06*
(?LSERV) (0.04) (0.035)
Difference in the Number of Collateral Types 0.26** 0.25** 0.23** 0.22**
(?COLLAT) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Difference in Bank Type -0.16 -0.15 -0.06 -
(?BANK) (0.101) (-1.29) (-0.12)
Difference in Distance to Bank 0.00 - - -
(?DIST) (0.01)
Intercept 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 0.09**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Adjusted R-squared 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.13
Observations 226 226 226 226
Table II
Difference in the LOC Limits Explained by Differences in Relationships, Loan Contract, and Banking 
Institution 
The results of the OLS regressions explaining the difference in Lines of Credit Limits using the differences in relationship 
variables, contract features, lending institution type.  The dependent variable is the log difference between the two Lines of 
Credit Limits: ln(Limit 1/Limit 2).  This reduces heteroscedasticity across firms.  The Eicker-White standard errors are in 
parentheses.  * & ** indicate significance at the 10 percent and 5 percent levels.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Independent Variables
Otherwise Corporations
Difference in the Years of Relationship 0.013 0.016** 0.012** 0.015** 0.012**
(?LENGTH) (0.01) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Difference in Number of Non-Loan Services 0.38** 0.09 0.20** 0.18** 0.22**
(?NLSERV) (0.14) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Difference in the Number of Loan Services -0.13** -0.04 -0.06* -0.06** -0.08**
(?LSERV) (0.07) (0.04) (0.037) (0.03) (0.03)
Difference in the Number of Collateral Types 0.16** 0.24** 0.24** 0.23** 0.21**
(?COLLAT) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Heckman Adjustment term for sample selection - - - 0.19 -
(1.54)
Difference in Unused Balance - - - - 0.11**
(?BALANCE) (0.03)
Intercept 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 0.03 0.09**
(0.01) (0.007) (0.006) (1.15) (0.006)
Adjusted R-squared 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.2
Observations 67 159 181 226 200
Adjusted for 
sample 
selection
Table III
Robustness Check: Difference in the LOC Limits Explained by Differences in Relationships and Loan Contract
The results of the OLS regressions explaining the difference in Lines of Credit Limits using the differences in relationship variables and 
contract features.  The dependent variable is the log difference between the two Lines of Credit Llimits.  The Eicker-White standard 
errors are in parentheses.  * & ** indicate significance at the 10% and 5% levels.
with "Mature" 
relationships
With Interest 
Rate Proxy
Stratification
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(1) (2) (3)
Variable
Difference in the Years of Relationship 0.012** 0.015** 0.014**
(?LENGTH) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Difference in Number of Non-Loan Services 0.15** 0.15* 0.18**
(?NLSERV) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Difference in the Number of Loan Services -0.06* -0.06* -0.07**
(?LSERV) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034)
Difference in the number of collateral types 0.23** 0.21** 0.21**
(?COLLAT) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Intercept 0.09** 0.09** 0.09**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Adjusted R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.14
Observations 221 221 221
Robustness Checks
Table IV
Excl. DFBETA 
?LENGTH
Excl. DFBETA 
?NLSERV
Excl. DFBETA 
?LSERV
The dependent variable is the log difference between the two Lines of Credit "Limits." The Eicker-White
standard errors are in parentheses. * & ** indicate significance at the 10% and 5% levels. The data points
with most influence on respective coefficients obtained by a Jack knife process of excluding one data point
at a time and observing the change in coefficients. The 5 highest influence points in absolute value are
excluded from the regressions. For an example, the five data points with most influence on the ?LENGTH
coefficient are excluded from the regression in Column (1)
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(1) (2)
Poisson Coefficients Probit Coefficients
Firm Characteristics and Governance
Firm Age (Years) 0.01** 0.003*
(3.05) (1.72)
Assets ($ '000) 0.09** 9E-9**
(4.71) (2.96)
S or C Corporation? (Yes=1) 0.43** 0.15*
(7.53) (1.82)
Market
Export Market? (Yes=1) 0.15** 0.05
(2.18) (0.46)
Sites of Operation (Multiple=1) 0.02** 0.013*
(3.28) (1.62)
Credit Issues and Risk Proxies
Credit Serious Problem in Last 12 months? (Yes=1) 0.79** 0.15**
(3.31) (2.13)
Owner Bankrupt in Last 7 years? (Yes=1) -0.36** -0.13
(-2.20) (-0.62)
Business Delinquencies? (Yes=1) -0.09 -0.12
(-0.34) (-0.10)
Judgment Rendered Against Owner? (Yes=1) -0.15 -0.12
(-1.40) (-1.28)
Trade Credit used? (Yes=1) 0.18** -0.02
(3.31) (-0.25)
Bank Variables
0.07 0.02
(1.48) (0.39)
Industry  (Relative to Retail)
Mining -0.31 -0.12
(-1.01) (-0.31)
Construction 0.12 -0.04
(1.53) (0.12)
Manufacturing 0.12 -0.29**
(1.38) (-2.26)
Utilities/Transport 0.05 -0.16
(0.31) (-0.99)
Wholesale 0.23** -0.11
(2.40) (-0.92)
Insurance -0.30** 0.22
(-2.09) (1.52)
Services -0.16** -0.38
(-2.35) (-3.90)
Constant -0.55** -0.49
(-4.98) (-3.16)
Regression Statistics
Pseudo R-squared 0.09 0.06
Prob>Chi2 0 0
Observations 4514 4514
Herfindahl for Banks in Region (1=More Competition)
Variable
Table A.1
Firm Characteristics and Multiple Lines of Credit
Column (1) presents the results of a Poisson regression explaining the number of Credit Lines in terms of firm
characteristics. The Dependent Variable is Count Data on the number of Credit Lines firms have from different
banks: 0,1,2, or 3. T-statistics in parentheses. Column (2) is a Probit regression explaining the binary variable
(firm with multiple LOCs=1 all others = 0). ** & * indicates significance at 5% & 10% respectively. Data is
from the full sample of firms.  
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Credit Limit Ratio 3.8 2.2 1 4.5
Credit Limit Usage 0.5 0.4 1 0.3
Credit Limit Asset ratio 0.8 0.4 - 1
Table A4
Descriptive Statistics of Credit Limits and Usage
Figure A1 Figure A2
Figure A3
